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The basics of banking
In order to draw lessons from the banking crisis, it is
useful to start from the basics of banking.1 Banks are
in the business of borrowing short and lending long.
In doing so they provide an essential service to the
rest of us, i.e., they create credit that allows the real
economy to grow and expand.
This credit creation service,however,is based on an
inherent fragility of the banking system. If deposi-
tors are gripped by a collective movement of distrust
and decide to withdraw their deposits at the same
time, banks will be unable to satisfy these with-
drawals as their assets are illiquid.A liquidity crisis
erupts.
In normal times,when people have confidence in the
banks, these crises do not occur. But confidence can
quickly disappear, for example, when one or more
banks experience a solvency problem due to non-per-
forming loans.Then bank runs are possible.A liquid-
ity crisis erupts that can bring down sound banks al-
so.The latter become innocent bystanders that are hit
in the same way as the insolvent banks by the collec-
tive movement of distrust.
The problem does not end here.A devilish interaction
between liquidity crisis and solvency crisis is set in
motion. Sound banks that are hit by deposit with-
drawals have to sell assets to confront these with-
drawals.The ensuing fire sales lead to declines in as-
set prices,reducing the value of banks’ assets.This in
turn erodes the equity base of the banks and leads to
a solvency problem.The cycle can start again:the sol-
vency problem of these banks ignites a new liquidity
crisis and so on.
The last great banking crisis occurred in the 1930s.Its
effects were devastating for the real economy.After
that crisis the banking system was fundamentally re-
formed.These reforms were intended to make such a
banking crisis impossible.The reforms had three es-
sential ingredients.First,the central bank took on the
responsibility of lender of last resort.Second deposit
insurance mechanisms were instituted.These two re-
forms were aimed at eliminating collective move-
ments of panic.A third reform was intended to pre-
vent commercial banks from taking on too many
risks. In the US this took the form of the Glass-
Steagall Act, which, introduced in 1933, separated
commercial banking from investment banking.
Most economists thought that these reforms would
be sufficient to produce a less fragile banking system
and to prevent large scale banking crises. It was not
to be.Why? In order to answer this question it is use-
ful to first discuss “moral hazard”.
The insurance provided by central banks and gov-
ernments in the form of lender of last resort and de-
posit insurance gives bankers strong incentives to
take more risks. To counter this, authorities have to
supervise and regulate,much like any private insurer
who wants to avoid moral hazard will do.
And that’s what the monetary authorities did during
most of the post-war period.They subjected banks to
tight regulation aimed at preventing them from tak-
ing on too much risk.But then something remarkable
happened.
The efficient market paradigm 
From the 1970s on, economists were all gripped by
the intellectual attraction of the efficient market par-
adigm.This paradigm,which originated in academia,
became hugely popular. also outside academia. Its
main ingredients are the following.
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1 A very useful book is Goodhart and Illing (2002).First,financial markets efficiently allocate savings to-
wards the most promising investment projects,there-
by maximizing welfare. Second, asset prices reflect
underlying fundamentals.As a result,bubbles cannot
occur,and neither can crashes.The third ingredient of
the efficient market paradigm is the capacity of mar-
kets for self-regulation.The proponents of this para-
digm told us that financial markets can regulate them-
selves perfectly well and that regulation by govern-
ments or central banks is unnecessary and even harm-
ful (Greenspan 2007).
The efficient markets paradigm was extremely influ-
ential.It was also used by bankers to lobby for dereg-
ulation. If markets work so beautifully, there was no
need for regulation anymore. And bankers achieved
their objective. They were progressively deregulated
in the US and in Europe.The culmination was the re-
peal of the Glass-Steagall act in 1999 by the Clinton
administration. This allowed commercial banks to
take on all the activities investment banks had been
taking,e.g.,the underwriting and holding of securities;
the development of new and risky assets like deriva-
tives and complex structured credit products. Thus
banks were allowed to take on all risky activities that
the Great Depression had taught us could lead to
problems.The lessons of history were forgotten.
The efficient market paradigm provided the intellec-
tual backing for deregulation of financial markets in
general and the banking sector in particular.At about
the same time financial markets experienced a burst
of innovations.Financial innovations led to the design
of new financial products. These made it possible to
repackage assets into different risk classes and to price
these risks differently.It also allowed banks to securi-
tize their loans, i.e. to repackage them in the form of
asset backed securities (ABSs)
and to sell these on the market.
This led to the belief, inspired by
the optimism of the efficient mar-
ket paradigm, that securitization
and the development of complex
financial products would lead to
a better spreading of the risk over
many more people,thereby reducing systemic risk and
reducing the need to supervise and regulate financial
markets. A new era of free and unencumbered pro-
gress would be set in motion.
Are financial markets efficient?
Deregulation and financial innovation promised to
bring great welfare improvements:better risk spread-
ing;lower costs of credit,benefitting firms who would
invest more and benefitting millions of consumers
who would have access to cheap mortgages.
The trouble is that financial markets are not efficient.
We illustrate this lack of efficiency in the two dimen-
sions that matter for the stability of the banking sec-
tor.2First,bubbles and crashes are an endemic feature
of financial markets.Second,financial markets are in-
capable of regulating themselves.In the end both fail-
ures brought down the new banking model that was
predicated on financial markets being efficient.
Bubbles and crashes are endemic in financial
markets
Nobody has written a better book on the capacity of
financial markets to generate bubbles and crashes than
Kindleberger in his masterful Manias, Panics and
Crashes.3 Kindleberger shows how the history of cap-
italism is littered with episodes during which asset mar-
kets are caught by a speculative fever that pushes
prices to levels unrelated to fundamental economic
variables.But the lessons from history were forgotten.
Let us look at some of the bubbles and crashes that
have littered financial markets during the last twen-
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2 The empirical evidence against the effi-
ciency of financial markets has been build-
ing up over the last decade. For useful
overviews see Shleifer (2000) and Shiller
(2000).
3 See Kindleberger (2005). Chancellor
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ty five years.Take the US stock market from 2006 to
2008 (see Figure 1).
What happened in the US economy between July
2006 and July 2007 to warrant an increase of 30 per-
cent in the value of stocks? Or put differently,in July
2006 US stock market capitalization was $11.5 tril-
lion.One year later it was $15 trillion.What happened
to the US economy to make it possible that $3.5 tril-
lion was added to the value of US corporations in just
one year? During the same year GDP increased by
only 5 percent ($650 billion).
The answer is:almost nothing.Fundamentals like pro-
ductivity growth increased at their normal rate.The on-
ly reasonable answer is that there was excessive opti-
mism about the future of the US economy. Investors
were caught by a wave of optimism that made them be-
lieve that the US was on a new and permanent growth
path for the indefinite future. Such beliefs of future
wonders can be found in almost all bubbles in history,
as is made vividly clear in Kindleberger’s book.
Then came the downturn with the credit crisis.In one
year’s time (July 2007 to July 2008) stock prices
dropped by 30 percent,destroying $3.5 trillion of val-
ue. The same amount as had been created the year
before. What happened? Investors finally realized
that the optimism had been excessive. The wave
turned into one of excessive pessimism.
A similar story can be told about the US housing mar-
ket.Figure 2 shows the Case-Shiller house price index
from 2000 to 2008. During 2000–07 US house prices
more than doubled.What happened to economic fun-
damentals in the US that warranted a doubling of
house prices in seven years time?
Very little.Again the driving force
was excessive optimism.Prices in-
creased because they were ex-
pected to increase indefinitely in-
to the future.This was also the ex-
pectation that convinced US con-
sumers that building up mortgage
debt would not create future re-
payment problems.
These episodes illustrate the en-
demic nature of bubbles and
crashes in capitalist systems.They
happened in the past and will
continue to occur in the future.
The deregulation of the banking sector that started in
the 1980s fully exposed the banks to the endemic oc-
currence of bubbles and crashes in asset markets.
Because banks were allowed to hold the full panoply
of financial assets, their balance sheets became ex-
tremely sensitive to bubbles and crashes that gripped
these assets. This is shown in a spectacular way in
Figure 3. It illustrates how since the start of the
decade the balance sheets of the major European
banks exploded, reflecting the various bubbles that
occurred at that time (housing bubble, stock market
bubbles, commodities bubbles).
While commercial banks were increasingly involving
themselves in financial markets and thus were taking
over activities that were reserved to investment
banks, the opposite occurred with investment banks.
The latter increasingly behaved like banks, i.e., they











CASE SHILLER COMPOSITE INDICES
nominal          
Figure 2
Figure 3the business of credit creation. To give an example.
Investment banks (e.g.,Lehman Brothers) moved in-
to the business of lending money to hedge funds and
accepted stocks or other securities as collateral.They
then went on and lent that collateral to others so as
to make extra money.Thus,investment banks had be-
come banks in that they were creating credit. In the
process they created an unbalanced maturity struc-
ture of assets and liabilities. Their assets were long
term and illiquid, while their liabilities had a very
short maturity.
Thus, as a result of deregulation a double movement
occurred: Commercial banks moved into investment
bank territory and investment banks moved into
commercial bank territory. This led to a situation in
which both the commercial banks and the investment
banks built up a lethal combination of credit and liq-
uidity risks.
The mirage of self-regulation of financial markets
A centerpiece of the efficient market theory was that
financial markets were capable of self-regulation,
making government regulation redundant. Two me-
chanisms were seen as central in making self-regula-
tion work. One was the role of rating agencies; the
other was the use of mark-to-market rules.
Rating agencies would guarantee a fair and objective
rating of banks and their financial products.It did not
happen.The reason was that there was massive con-
flict of interest in the rating agencies.These both ad-
vised financial institutions on how to create new fi-
nancial products and later on gave a favourable rat-
ing to the same products.Their incentives, instead of
leading to the creation of sound and safe financial
products, were skewed towards producing risky and
unsafe products.
The other piece in the belief that markets would reg-
ulate themselves was the idea of mark-to-market. If
financial institutions used mark to market rules the
discipline of the market would force them to price
their products correctly.Since prices always reflected
fundamental values, mark-to-market rules would
force financial institutions to reveal the truth about
the value of their business, allowing investors to be
fully informed when making investment decisions.
The trouble here again was the efficiency of markets.
As we have illustrated,financial markets are regular-
ly gripped by bubbles and crashes. In such an envi-
ronment mark-to-market rules,instead of being a dis-
ciplining force,worked pro-cyclically.Thus during the
bubble this rule told accountants that the massive as-
set price increases corresponded to real profits that
should be recorded in the books. Now the reverse is
happening.Mark to market rules force massive write-
downs, correcting for the massive overvaluations in-
troduced the years before, intensifying the sense of
gloom and the economic downturn.
Long-term solutions: a return to narrow banking
It is time to start working on the rules for a new bank-
ing system. There are two ways to go forward. One
can be called the Basle approach,the other the Glass-
Steagall approach.
The Basle approach accepts as a fait accompli that
banks will go on performing both traditional and in-
vestment bank activities.This approach then consists
in defining and implementing rules governing the
risks that these banks can take. Its philosophy is that
a suitable analysis of the risk profile of the banks’ as-
set portfolios allows for calculating the required cap-
ital to be used as a buffer against future shocks in
credit risk. Once these minimum capital ratios are in
place,credit risk accidents can be absorbed by the ex-
isting equity,preventing banks from going broke and
thereby avoiding the devilish spillovers from solven-
cy problems into liquidity problems.
This approach has completely failed. It was first im-
plemented in the Basle 1 accord, but was massively
circumvented by banks that profited from the loop-
holes in the system.Basle 2 attempted to remedy this
by allowing banks to use internal risk models to com-
pute their minimum capital ratios.The underlying as-
sumption was that scientific advances in risk analysis
would make it possible to develop a reliable method
of determining minimum capital ratios.
This approach to managing banks’ risks does not
work and will never do so, because it assumes effi-
ciency of financial markets; an assumption that must
be rejected.4 Banks that fully participate in the fi-
nancial markets subject themselves to the endemic
occurrence of bubbles and crashes.These lead to large
CESifo DICE Report 2/2009 22
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tail risks that with our present knowledge cannot be
quantified.There is no prospect for gaining substan-
tial knowledge about tail risks in the near future.The
Basle approach must be abandoned.
This leaves only one workable approach.This is a re-
turn to the Glass-Steagall Act approach, or put dif-
ferently, a return to narrow banking in which the ac-
tivities banks can engage in are narrowly circum-
scribed.In this approach banks are excluded from in-
vesting in equities, derivatives and complex struc-
tured products. Investment in such products can on-
ly be performed by financial institutions, investment
banks, which are forbidden from funding these in-
vestments by deposits (either obtained from the pub-
lic of from other commercial banks).
In a nutshell a return to narrow banking could be im-
plemented as follows. Financial institutions would be
forced to choose between the status of a commercial
bank and that of investment bank. Only the former
would be allowed to attract deposits from the public
and from other commercial banks and to transform
these into a loan portfolio with a longer maturity (du-
ration). Commercial banks would benefit from the
lender of last resort facility and deposit insurance,and
would be subject to the normal bank supervision and
regulation.The other financial institutions that do not
opt for a commercial bank status would have to ensure
that the duration of their liabilities is on average at
least as long as the duration of their assets.This would
imply, for example, that they would not be allowed to
finance their illiquid assets by short-term credit lines
from commercial banks.Thus while commercial banks
would be barred from engaging in activities of invest-
ment banks, the reverse would also hold, i.e., invest-
ment banks would not be allowed to borrow short and
to lend long,thereby taking on liquidity risks.
Thus, we would return to a world where banking ac-
tivities are tightly regulated and separated from in-
vestment banking activities. This also implies that
commercial banks would no longer be allowed any-
more to sell (securitize) their loan portfolio. Secu-
ritization leads to a build-up of the credit pyramid.
When a bank securitizes a loan, it obtains new liq-
uidities that can be used to grant new loans,which in
turn can be used to securetize further.As a result, a
credit expansion is made possible which occurs out-
side the supervision and control of the central bank
(which,however,will be called upon to buy these as-
sets when it becomes the lender of last resort). Put
differently, securitization allows the credit multiplier
to increase for any given level of the money base pro-
vided by the central bank.Credit gets out of control,
endangering the whole banking system,including the
central bank.It is worth stressing the latter point.The
massive credit expansion made possible by securiti-
zation also endangers the balance sheet of the central
bank.This is so because in times of crisis, the central
bank is called upon to function as a lender of last re-
sort.As a result, it will be faced with the need to ac-
cept as collateral securitized assets that were created
by banks. Allowing banks to securitize thus means
that the central bank takes on a substantial part of
the risk.
The preceding argument also implies that the “origi-
nate and distribute model” that banks have increas-
ingly used in the recent past must be abandoned.
Recent proposals to save it by requiring banks to hold
a fraction of the securitized assets on their balance
sheets are inappropriate as they do not eliminate the
risk arising from the multiplication of credit de-
scribed in the previous paragraph.
A return to narrow banking will necessitate a co-op-
erative international approach. When only one or a
few countries return to narrow banking,the banks of
these countries will face a competitive disadvantage.
They will loose market shares to banks less tightly
regulated. As a result, they will have forceful argu-
ments to lobby domestically against the tight restric-
tions they face. In the end, the governments of these
countries will yield and the whole process of deregu-
lation will start again.
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